The Application of Levers for Digital Service Groups
Author: Lauren Lombardo, Master of Public Policy, 2021
After the 2020 Digital Services Convening, David Eaves, Tom Loosemore, and Lauren Lombardo published a paper titled “Introduction to Levers for Digital Service Groups.” This paper sought to understand how digital teams use (or aspire to use) levers to scale impact across the government. It focused primarily on defining levers and mapping how they might be secured and used to influence or mandate change. In addition to analyzing how levers could be operationalized, the paper published a categorized list of them. This list was socialized before and during the 2020 convening and was later updated based on feedback from convening attendees.
The 2020 paper communicated four key takeaways:
- Levers can be given or built. A digital service can be granted levers by an external authority or build its own. Successful teams should collect a combination of both types.
- Voluntary and mandatory levers can be equally powerful. A group should pursue the combination of levers needed to execute its transformation strategy.
- Levers must be used appropriately. Overusing a lever can create resentment, but underusing it can lead other departments to ignore the group’s power.
- Levers can compound over time. Levers are used to achieve a particular end. This political capital can be used to accumulate even more power over time.
The 2020 convening conversation and accompanying paper succeeded in creating a shared framework with which to discuss the power of digital service groups. It also allowed us to begin analyzing this power’s practical implications. However, the 2020 work exclusively mapped these frameworks to GDS as a means of understanding application and impact. At the time, this allowed us to get the conversation started using the lived experience of Loosemore.
During the past year, we’ve spent time discussing this framework with a variety of digital service groups and have had many more chances to apply the model. For this reason, we were able to spend part of the 2021 Digital Services Convening digging into how these levers apply to a variety of digital service groups. We examined case studies from four distinct digital service groups: CDS (United States), GovTech (Singapore), Communication and Information Technology Authority (Mongolia), and the Department of Health and Social Care (United Kingdom). These case studies not only showcased the power of different levers but also provided four unique ways that teams might secure and use the levers in their control.
Colorado Digital Service, United States
(levers: service assessments — the group assesses whether a new service should go live and ensures that all new services meet its standards; hiring — the group can attract and hire new digital talent)
The CDS team created a service assessment, referred to as the Modern Software Delivery Matrix, to determine if a project would succeed in meeting the digital team’s service standards. This matrix incorporated elements from GOV.UK’s service assessment and 18F’s Quality Assurance Plan and provided a framework the team could use to assess projects. For more context, read the above article entitled “The Next Phase of Digital Service Teams Can Benefit from Existing Digital Tools.”
During the convening, this case revealed two important connections to our 2020 framework: the power of voluntary levers and compounding levers. First, the CDS team was not granted the service assessment lever but rather built it during a project on Colorado’s child welfare system, making this service assessment a great example of how much power a self-built, voluntary lever can have on shaping or shifting decisions when used intentionally.
Second, when the CDS team began using this lever during the child welfare system project, it noticed that the project was at “low maturity” along the engineering dimensions and the state was not positioned to enforce quality standards on the procured vendor. Because the team was able to point out these problem areas during the project, it was able to propose and support solutions for issues that would have otherwise been barriers to success for the project.
Importantly, the agreed-upon solution was that the CDS team would have direct hiring authority over a tech lead for the project, who would act as the senior-most engineer. In this instance, the CDS’s assessment lever was used to provide the team limited access to the hiring lever. Although the compounding influence of the service assessment was temporary and constrained in this instance, the team was able to successfully leverage its existing power to access and exert additional capabilities necessary to successfully complete this project.
GovTech, Singapore
(lever: procurement — shape or influence the procurement process to simplify the process or improve the quality of outcomes)
While the CDS team’s service assessment is a great example of a voluntary lever, the GovTech case showcases how a strong, mandatory lever can be used to effectively implement governance processes changes. The GovTech team leveraged the procurement lever to build an agile-aligned procurement process that other government departments could opt in to use. Not only did GovTech’s procurement model create a viable option for efficient and collaborative procurement, but it also provided the GovTech team with the ability to set procurement rules and guidelines for any departments that used its process and system.
GovTech’s procurement system establishes demand aggregation contracts with flexible terms, allowing for the later addition of new suppliers and requirements. The team also reengineered the procurement process to reduce individual agency effort. Its efforts resulted in 30 demand aggregation contracts for several competencies including cloud, data science, and cybersecurity that any agency can leverage. These changes have reduced the time required per procurement period from five business months to five to ten business days and resulted in a 30% cost saving and 50% effort reduction. This success has also helped GovTech build relationships with government departments and show value to political leaders.
Communication and Information Technology Authority, Mongolia
(levers: communications power — group has access to communications platform; cool factor — the group is the first to access and use new tools)
The Communication and Information Technology Authority began using creative public outreach and communication practices to increase public trust in government programs and services. As part of this campaign, the team worked with a network of social media influencers to test and promote the e-mongolia website. These efforts were centered on trying to change the way citizens traditionally perceived the government and were contingent upon the team’s communications power and cool factor levers.
The team already had communications power through its established government function. However, while the communications power lever was strong, it was not flexible or boundless. For the team to implement its influencer-oriented approach toward community outreach, a novel idea at the time, it had to push for the cool factor lever. Upon securing the cool factor lever, and therefore the ability to work creatively with social media outlets, the team was able to use its success to prove the value of new practices and overcome the inertia of existing, outdated approaches.
This case touches on the importance of properly combining several levers to reach a certain end. Many of the levers digital service groups may use are fine independently but become truly powerful when used together. In this instance, communications power was a strong lever, but the team was only able to be truly transformative when it was able to join this lever with the cool factor lever.
Department of Health and Social Care, United Kingdom
(lever: magic wand — the group can avoid rules and processes that must otherwise be adhered to)
The UK Department of Health and Social Care presents an interesting case of both rare and transitioning levers. Because the organization was in the midst of responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, many teams within the department were granted the magic wand lever. This extremely rare lever allowed the organization to operate outside of regular, bureaucratic traditions.
The lever enabled it to remove many of the typical hurdles, including those involved in traditional procurement and hiring processes. As discussed in the “Confronting a Pandemic: The Case of NHS Track and Trace” article, this lever was granted to the Test and Trace team and is largely responsible for that team’s ability to respond quickly at the height of the pandemic.
However, many of these bureaucratic norms are established to protect both the government institution and practitioners. Further, long-term organizational change will likely come from modifying and improving these governance structures, not by allowing some teams to circumvent them. For these reasons, the magic wand lever is frequently not a sustainable, long-term tool.
In the 2020 article, we discussed how levers transition over time. Now, as the COVID-19 outbreak moves from novel to endemic, so too will many of the levers granted as crisis response tools transition into more suitable long-term powers. It will be interesting to see which powers this team is able and willing to retain and which ones it will attempt to roll back.
